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Laterality and body ownership: Effect of handedness
on experience of the rubber hand illusion
M. Smita, D. I. Kooistraa, I. J. M. van der Hamb and H. C. Dijkermana
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ABSTRACT
Body ownership has mainly been linked to the right hemisphere and larger
interhemispheric connectivity has been shown to be associated with greater
right hemispheric activation. Mixed-handed participants tend to have more
interhemispheric connectivity compared to extreme handed participants. The
aim of this study was to examine whether feelings of ownership as assessed
with the rubber hand illusion (RHI) are differentiated by handedness and
differed between the left and right hand. Sinistrals-, dextrals-, and mixed-
handed individuals (n = 63) were subjected to the RHI. Stroking was
synchronously and asynchronously performed on both the participant’s hand
and a rubber hand. Outcome measures were an embodiment questionnaire
and proprioceptive drift. In contrast to our hypotheses we show a similar
experience of ownership for all groups, which may indicate no hemispheric
specialization for the illusion. In addition, plasticity of ownership and body
ownership are similar for the left hand and right hand in all participants,
which suggests similar representations for both hands in the brain. This might
be useful to maintain a coherent sense of the body in space.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 8 November 2015; Accepted 24 November 2016
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Introduction
When someone points at your hand and asks if that hand belongs to you, you
will immediately confirm that it is your hand. But how do we know that our
hand actually belongs to our body? This may not be as self-evident as it
appears. Indeed, body ownership can be experimentally manipulated and
therefore examined with for example the well-known rubber hand illusion
(RHI). In this illusion, participants see a rubber hand being stroked, while sim-
ultaneously the occluded real hand is being stroked. As a result, the partici-
pants refer their tactile sensations to the rubber hand (Botvinick & Cohen,
1998). In other words, participants have the illusionary experience that they
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can feel the touch they visually perceive on the rubber hand. The tactile, pro-
prioceptive, and visual information are integrated into a single experience.
And when this multisensory input is congruent to internal models of the
body, participants have the impression that the rubber hand becomes
part of their own body (Valenzuela Moguillansky, O’Regan, & Petitmengin,
2013).
Previous studies suggest a strong link between the right hemisphere and
awareness of the subjective experience of body ownership (e.g., Frasinetti,
Maini, Romualdi, Galante, & Avanzi, 2008; Karnath & Baier, 2010; Tsakiris,
Hesse, Boy, Haggard, & Fink, 2007; Vallar & Ronchi, 2009). More specifically,
brain areas involved in body ownership include the right temporoparietal
junction (Tsakiris, Constantini, & Haggard, 2008), the secondary somatosen-
sory cortex (Press, Heyes, Haggard, & Eimer, 2008), the posterior parietal
and ventral premotor cortices (Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 2004; Zeller,
Gross, Bartsch, Johansen-Berg, & Classen, 2011), and the right posterior
insula (Karnath & Baier, 2010). This is further supported by the right lateraliza-
tion of brain lesions that typically lead to somatoparaphrenia (misidentifica-
tion and confabulation of limbs) (Vallar & Ronchi, 2009).
Research with split-brain patients has shown that feelings of ownership
depend on interhemispheric communication, specifically in the posterior
corpus callosum (Uddin, 2011). Interestingly, interhemispheric connectivity
appears to vary with handedness. Studies have revealed that the corpus cal-
losum of sinistrals tends to be larger than the corpus callosum of dextrals,
which suggests greater interhemispheric connectivity in sinistrals (Gutwinski
et al., 2011). This is particularly relevant, since one’s percept of one’s own
bodymay entail cross-talk between the two hemispheres. The left hemisphere
has been suggested (Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998; Ramachandran,
Rogers-Ramachandran, & Cobb, 1995) to serve as a belief maintenance
system in an ever-changing world, while the right hemisphere updates and
evaluates these beliefs, that is, detects anomalies. This may also have impli-
cations for body representations. Research by Hach and Schütz-Bosbach
(2010) concerning representation of one’s own body space suggested that
implicit body representation differences (e.g., indicate stimuli on one’s left
and right body midline with eyes closed) are linked to a stronger lateralization
or greater activation imbalance in dextrals. In contrast, sinistrals have greater
access to right hemispheric functions, such as an “up to date” body represen-
tation following synchronized visuotactile input. As a consequence they might
experience ownership over a fake hand to a greater extent (Hach & Schütz-
Bosbach, 2010).
However, other studies show that body ownership may not depend on the
direction (whether one is left or right handed), but on the degree of handed-
ness. Niebauer, Aselage, and Schutte (2002) found that mixed-handed partici-
pants are more receptive to ownership of a rubber hand than extreme handed
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participants. Their results indicated that, when strength of handedness
increased, scores on the illusion scale decreased in the left hand RHI. In
their second experiment, participants had to say “now”when, during stroking,
participants experienced touch coming from the rubber hand or when partici-
pants felt the fake hand becoming part of their body. Time to experience
these feelings of ownership increased when (absolute) laterality quotients
increased (Niebauer et al., 2002). Christman, Henning, Geers, Propper, and Nie-
bauer (2008) and Prichard, Propper, and Christman (2013), support this line of
reasoning, and suggest that mixed-handed individuals have greater interhe-
mispheric connectivity than extreme-handed individuals. Moreover, research
by Luders et al. (2010) showed a negative association between callosal size
and handedness lateralization in which extreme handedness was associated
with smaller corpus callosum size. Interestingly, when extreme handed partici-
pants were compared with mixed-handed participants, a decrease in right
hemisphere activation was found (Propper, Pierce, Geisler, Christman, & Bel-
lorado, 2012). As body ownership appears to be right lateralized, this may
suggest that mixed-handed participants have a better-developed sense of
body ownership. In the current study we tested this hypothesis by applying
the RHI to participants with varying degrees of left or right handedness.
Since handedness constitutes a robust proxy for laterality, we aim to test
the effect of handedness on the subjective and objective experience of the
RHI.
So far, most studies, that investigated the RHI, tested dextrals with a left
rubber hand (e.g., Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Haggard & Jundi, 2009; Tsakiris
& Haggard, 2005) or a right rubber hand (e.g., Armel & Ramachandran,
2003; Constantini & Haggard, 2007; Kammers, de Vignemont, Verhagen, & Dij-
kerman, 2009; Lloyd, 2007; Shimada, Fukuda, & Hiraki, 2009). A few studies
used both hands but did not statistically compare the hands (e.g., Pavani,
Spence, & Driver, 2000; Walton & Spence, 2004). Mussap and Salton (2006)
did compare the hands, but did not find a subjective (using an embodiment
questionnaire) difference between the left and right hand. Interestingly,
Michael et al. (2012) found that particularly dextrals are more receptive to
spontaneous sensations (e.g., beat/pulse, tickle) for their left hand as
opposed to their right hand.
With respect to handedness, so far, only a few studies, incorporated a few
sinistrals (e.g., Constantini & Haggard, 2007; Haans, IJsselsteijn, & de Kort,
2008; IJsselsteijn, de Kort, & Haans, 2006; Rohde, Di Luca, & Ernst, 2011) and
only Haans et al. (2008) tested whether handedness influenced experience
of the RHI. They reported no difference in experience between sinistrals
and dextrals. However, this might be due to a lack of statistical power, since
18 of the 23 participants were right handed and thus the number of sinistrals
was very small. To date, only Ocklenburg, Rüther, Peterburs, Pinnow, and Gün-
türkün (2011) systematically explored whether sinistrals and dextrals differed
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in experience of the RHI. Experience of the illusion was measured with skin
conductance responses (SCR) and an embodiment questionnaire. The SCR
was stronger for the left hand, while there was no difference between sinis-
trals and dextrals when experience of the illusion was objectively measured.
Taken together, the right hemisphere, linked to the somatosensory and
visual signals from the left side of the body, as opposed to the left hemi-
sphere, seems to update at a faster rate. This is consistent with the enhanced
spontaneous sensations for the left hand (Michael et al., 2012) and suscepti-
bility of the RHI for the left hand (Ocklenburg et al., 2011).
In order to decipher inconsistencies regarding laterality (extreme versus
mixed) and the hand used (left versus right) in the sense of ownership, we sys-
tematically examine differences in sense of ownership between sinistrals, dex-
trals (extreme-handed), and mixed-handed individuals, by using relatively
large groups. In addition to the classic subjective (embodiment) question-
naires we also use an established objective measure of the RHI, that is, pro-
prioceptive drift instead of using skin conductance, the latter being used in
Ocklenburg et al., 2011). We also use stringent handedness quotients; partici-
pants were considered sinistral if the laterality quotient, according to the Edin-
burgh Handedness Inventory: The EHI (Oldfield, 1971), was below −80, mixed
handed if the laterality quotient was between −80 and 80 and dextral if the
laterality quotient was above 80. It is important to note that Ocklenburg
et al. (2011) differentiated sinistral and dextral as smaller or larger than
zero. Niebauer et al. (2002) however found a correlation between ownership
over the rubber hand and handedness, but did not specify the average EHI
score in their study. Based on previous research we hypothesize a different
experience of the RHI for the different handedness groups. We specifically
expect differences in experience of the RHI on both the objective and subjec-
tive measures for mixed-handed participants as opposed compared to
extreme handed (sinistrals and dextrals). In addition, we expected a higher




Sixty-three individuals participated. The individuals were screened online
prior to participation. Online questionnaires contained questions regarding
demographics (age, sex, and education), the EHI (Oldfield, 1971), a screening
for history of neurological/psychiatric disorders and substance abuse. Partici-
pants who reported either a history of neurological/psychiatric disorders or
substance abuse were excluded from participation. Participant demographics
are shown in Table 1. Based on laterality quotients calculated for the EHI (for
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the equation, see below, materials), 21 participants were assigned to either
the group of sinistrals, mixed-handed participants and dextrals. As stated by
Hardie and Wright (2014), a majority of laterality studies use a notional
median of 80 (e.g., Christman & Butler, 2011; Jasper, Barry, & Christman,
2008; Lyle & Orsborn, 2011; Westfall, Jasper, & Christman, 2012). Therefore,
participants were considered extreme handed if the laterality quotient was
below −80 (sinistrals) or above 80 (dextrals) and mixed handed if the laterality
quotient was between −80 and 80. Additionally, in order to make compari-
sons across former studies possible Ocklenburg et al. (2011) we also calculated
a broader, hence more liberal division between left- and right-handed individ-
uals; laterality quotients between −1 and −100 are considered left-handed
individuals and laterality quotients ranging from 1 till 100 are considered
right-handed individuals.
Prior to the experiment informed consent was obtained and the nature of
the study was clarified. Each participant received course credit or six Euros.
Design
A within-subjects design was used in which all participants completed four
stroking conditions twice, resulting in eight trials in total. The four conditions,
as shown in Figure 1, were synchronous left hand stroking, asynchronous left
hand stroking, synchronous right hand stroking and asynchronous right hand
stroking. Block order was pseudorandomized; four trials for one hand (two
synchronous and two asynchronous, see Figure 1) were performed before
stroking was performed on the other hand. Then, asynchronous stroking in
one hand was always followed by synchronous stroking. At random, the
experiment started with synchronous or asynchronous stroking of either
the left or right hand. The fifth trial, subsequently, started at random with syn-
chronous or asynchronous stroking of the other hand.
Table 1. Mean age and SD (standard deviation), gender and mean laterality quotients
and SD (as assessed with the EHI (Oldfield, 1971)) for handedness groups and total.
Age Gender Laterality quotienta
M SD Male Female M SD
Left-handed (n = 31) 23.30 (3.66) 12 19 −81.90 (24.14)
Right-handed (n = 31) 23.06 (4.34) 12 19 84.46 (17.35)
Extreme handed (n = 42) 22.64 (3.31) 14 27 −.42b (91.11)
Mixed handed (n = 21) 24.00 (4.97) 9 12 4.62 (61.79)
Total 23.10 (3.95) 24 39 1.26 (85.71)
aRange laterality quotients: Left-handed between −1 and −100; Right-handed between 1 and 100;
Extreme handed include sinistrals between −80 and −100 and dextrals between 80 and 100; Mixed
handed between −79 and 79.
bNote that the extreme handed individuals consist of sinistrals (average LQ =−95.10; SD = 7.40) and dex-
trals (average LQ = 94.25; SD = 7.57).
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Procedure/task/stimuli
Procedure
All measurements were conducted in a quiet lab at Utrecht University, and
participants were seated comfortably. Participants received a brief verbal
explanation and signed informed consent prior to the experiment. All trials
Figure 1. Top: Block order of stroking (i.e., synchronous, asynchronous) conditions for
both hands, and bottom: experimental set-up of all stroking conditions, from left to
right: left synchronous stroking, left asynchronous stroking, right synchronous stroking,
and right asynchronous stroking.
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consisted of measuring proprioceptive drift, inducing the RHI, measuring pro-
prioceptive drift, and filling out the embodiment questionnaire, respectively.
Questionnaire
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory: The EHI (Oldfield, 1971) consists of 10 items
for which the participant is instructed to place a checkmark which hand is pre-
ferred. If there is such a strong preference that the other hand would never be
used, the participant is instructed to place two checkmarks. Laterality quoti-
ents were calculated with the following formula.
LQ = R− L
R+ L× 100,
LQ stands for laterality quotient, L is the sum of checkmarks for the left
hand and R is the sum of checkmarks for the right hand.
RHI: Participants were seated at a table. The arm of their stimulated hand
and the arm of the rubber hand were covered with a black cloth. The cloth
prevented the participant to see the proximal end of the rubber hand. As
shown in Figure 1, the rubber hand and the hands of the participant were
placed on a fixed (marked) location within a wooden framework (79 cm in
width, see Figure 2 for exact dimensions). The space between the stimulated
own hand and the RH was approximately 17 cm. In the framework, there is a
compartment for the hidden stimulated hand (outer compartments) and a
compartment for the rubber hand and the unstimulated hand (inner compart-
ment). The positions of the hands were similar for all stroking conditions and
for each hand. The participant’s real hand was placed, depending on which
hand was stroked, in the outer compartment (see Figure 2) of the box. The
Figure 2. Experimental set-up and exact dimensions, see text for details.
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center of the wrist was placed on the red marks, and the rubber hand
was always on the same position on one of the red dots (depending on
which hand was being stroked) in the inner compartment. When measuring
proprioception (before and after illusion) a wooden lid was placed on top
of the box.
Stroking procedure: During the 90 sec illusion, both the unstimulated hand
and the rubber hand were visible for the participant. Two identical brushes
were used to stroke the rubber and the real hidden hand. Stroking was per-
formed from knuckle to fingertip. Outcome measures were embodiment
questionnaire and proprioceptive drift and will be discussed shortly. In the
synchronous conditions, the experimenter stroked the rubber hand and the
real hand of the participant synchronously. More specifically, we performed
similar but irregular stroke frequencies varying from one stroke per second
and one stroke per three seconds. In the asynchronous condition, the
rubber hand and the real hand were stroked sequentially in a similar
pattern. As such the brush only touched one hand at a time (either the
rubber hand or the real hand). In the left hand conditions, the real left hand
of the participant and the left rubber hand were stroked and vice versa for
the right hand conditions. Positioning of the hands of the participants was
similar in all conditions.
Embodiment questionnaire. An embodiment questionnaire was used to
measure subjective strength of the illusion (Kammers et al., 2009). The ques-
tionnaire consisted of 10 statements. Answers were given on a 10-point Likert
scale, ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 10 (agree strongly). Three of these
statements measure the subjective strength of the illusion. These statements
are:
It seemed as if I were feeling the touch of the paintbrush in the location where I
saw the rubber hand touched, it seemed as though the touch I felt was caused
by the paintbrush touching the rubber hand and it felt as if the rubber hand
were my hand.
The remaining statements are considered control questions (Kammers
et al., 2009). Since conditions were induced twice, the average of the con-
ditions was used for analyses. The 10 questions were analysed separately
and an average was calculated for the first 3 questions and the remaining
questions for each condition.
Proprioceptive drift
Proprioceptive drift was measured in millimetres. To assess proprioceptive
drift, a cardboard was placed on top of the box (so the participant could
not see to see his/her own hands and the rubber hand). The experimenter
moved her own index finger alongside the back of the box (random outwards
to inwards or vice versa) and the participant was instructed to say stop when
8 M. SMIT ET AL.
the index finger of the experimenter matched the location of where the par-
ticipant felt his/her own index finger. Using a small lead weight (hanging on
the index finger of the experimenter) and a tape measure, the location was
verified. Proprioception of the stimulated hand was measured first and of
the unstimulated hand second. Proprioceptive drift was the difference
between the estimated location of the index finger after induction of the
RHI and the estimated location of the index finger before induction of the
RHI. A positive number denoted a drift towards the rubber hand. All con-
ditions were induced twice; therefore the average proprioceptive drift for
each condition was used for analyses. The total duration of the experiment
was approximately 70 minutes.
Analyses
Most of our data were not normally distributed. We initially used transform-
ation procedures and outlier removal procedures offered by Field (2013).
Transforming the data (log transformation, square root transformation, reci-
procal transformation) or removing outliers (trimming data by deleting 10%
of the highest or lowest scores or excluding data above or below 2.5 SD or
3.5 SD) did not result in normally distributed data. Therefore we used a 2
(Hand-tested; left, right) × 2 (Synchronicity; synchronous, asynchronous) × 2
(Handedness; left-handed, right-handed, × 2 (Handedness strength;
extreme, mixed) mixed ANOVA and applied a non-parametric bootstrap
over the entire data set. Robust statistics, such as bootstrap has no assump-
tions about normality. It is also argued that transforming data (e.g., trimming
of outliers) is in this type of analyses no longer necessary. In this analysis we
used “hand-tested” (left versus right) and “synchronicity” (synchronous versus
asynchronous) as within subject factors and “handedness” (left-handers
versus right handers) and “handedness strength” (extreme versus mixed) as
between subject factors. In our bootstrap we used 1,000 iterations and
obtained 95% confidence intervals (CI) of F-values for each statistic and for
both outcome measures (i.e., proprioceptive drift and embodiment question-
naire). For readers’ convenience we presented two different divisions of Later-
ality Quotients (LQ) in each graph; in the left panel we presented data of the
extreme handed (LQ’s <−80 (sinistrals) and >80 (dextrals)) and mixed handed
(LQ’s between −80 and 80), in the right panel we presented left- (LQ’s
between −1 and −100) and right-handed (LQ’s between 1 and 100)1 data.
RStudio (2015) was used for statistical computing and bootstrapping
graphics. If not stated otherwise, alpha levels of .05 (two-tailed) were used
for the statistical tests.
1One participant was excluded from this division, as the LQ is exact zero.
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Results
Hypotheses
We expected the RHI to be stronger for the mixed-handed participants than
for the extreme-handed participants. In addition, we examined whether strok-
ing the left hand resulted in a higher degree of ownership over the rubber
hand than stroking the right hand in all handedness groups.
Subjective embodiment of the RHI
Questions 1–3 from the embodiment subscale formed the ownership sub-
scale (Kammers et al., 2009) and the higher the average score of this subscale,
the more subjective strength of the illusion was experienced.
It was therefore expected that questions 1–3 were scored above 5 (neutral)
in the synchronous but below 5 in the asynchronous conditions, for both
hands in all groups. As can be seen in Figure 3, and Figure 4, this was the
case for both the left and the right hand respectively. This indicates that in
general, for all groups, the illusion was successfully induced.
The remaining questions served as control questions (Kammers et al.,
2009). Scores above 5 could indicate that participants were influenced by
an “observer-expectancy” bias. These questions were grouped together on
the control subscale (average questions 4–10). The control questions are
shown in Figure 4 for the left hand and Figure 5 for the right hand stroking
conditions. No difference can be observed between synchronous and asyn-
chronous stroking and for both hands the average ratings were below 5, indi-
cating that it is highly unlikely that the subjective data were influenced by
experimenter bias.
Figure 3. Average of the “ownership scale” (average Q1–3) of the Embodiment question-
naire for the left hand in the synchronous and asynchronous condition for the extreme-
and mixed-handed division (left panel) and right-handed and left-handed division (right
panel). Error bars represent Standard Error (SE) of the mean.
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Taken together, visual inspection of the data suggests that the ownership
ratings in the synchronous condition were above neutral (average = 5) in all
groups, indicating the illusion was successfully induced. No difference can
be observed (see Figures 5 and 6) between synchronous and asynchronous
stroking across groups for the remaining control questions, and for all
groups the mean ratings were below 5. Formal statistical analyses were run
on the ownership subscale only.
For “synchronicity,” a mixed ANOVA revealed an expected main effect, F(1,
58) = 118.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .67, indicating that the subjective experience of
ownership was stronger in the synchronous than the asynchronous condition.
Figure 4. Average of the “ownership scale” (average Q1–3) of the Embodiment question-
naire for the right hand in the synchronous and asynchronous condition for the extreme-
and mixed-handed division (left panel) and right-handed and left-handed division (right
panel). Error bars represent Standard Error (SE) of the mean.
Figure 5. Average of the “control questions” (average Q4–10) of the Embodiment ques-
tionnaire for the left hand in the synchronous and asynchronous condition for the
extreme- and mixed-handed division (left panel) and right-handed and left-handed div-
ision (right panel). Error bars represent Standard Error (SE) of the mean.
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Other main-effects (i.e., “hand-tested,” “handedness (left versus right),” “hand-
edness strength” were not significant, summarized: F(1, 58) < 1.46, p > .232.
Against our expectation, there was no two-way interaction between “hand-
tested” and “synchronicity,” F(1, 58) = 0.25, p = .618, ηp2 < .01, indicating that
the subjective experience of ownership did not differ between the left and
right hand. Next, neither the interaction between “handedness strength”
and “synchronicity,” F(1, 58) = 0.04, p = .847, ηp2 < .01, nor the interaction
between “handedness” and “synchronicity” was significant F(1, 58) = 0.45,
p = .506, ηp2 = .01. There was a significant two-way interaction between
“handedness” × “hand-tested” F(1, 58) = 4.08, p = .048, ηp2 = .07. However
this effect did not interact with “synchronicity.” Other two-way interactions
that did not include the factor “synchronicity” and we had no specific hypoth-
eses about (i.e., “handedness” × “handedness strength;” “handedness
strength” × “hand-tested”) were not significant, summarized: F(1, 58) < 1.34,
p > .252.
Against our expectations, there was no three-way interaction between
“hand-tested,” “synchronicity,” “handedness strength,” F(1, 58) = 1.24,
p = .270, ηp2 = .02 nor a three-way interaction between “hand-tested,” “syn-
chronicity,” “handedness,” F(1, 58) = 2.60, p = .112, ηp2 = .04. The three-way
interaction of “handedness” × “handedness strength” × “hand-tested” was
not significant either F(1, 58) = 0.81, p = .373, ηp2 = .01.
Lastly, “synchronicity” did not interact with “hand-tested,” and different
“handedness groups” (i.e., left versus right; extreme versus mixed), F(1, 58)
= 1.38, p = .244, ηp2 = .02.
All in all, analyses indicate that for the subjective embodiment ownership
scale “synchronicity” had no differential impact in either the left or right hand
Figure 6. Average of the “control questions” (average Q4–10) of the Embodiment ques-
tionnaire for the right hand in the synchronous and asynchronous condition for the
extreme- and mixed-handed division (left panel) and right-handed and left-handed div-
ision (right panel). Error bars represent Standard Error (SE) of the mean.
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and both handedness groups (i.e., left- and right-handed individuals and,
extreme and mixed-handed individuals).
Hereafter we applied a non-parametric bootstrap with 1,000 iterations. We
then plotted (see Figure 7) the 95% confidence intervals (CI) of these F-values
for each statistical test. In Figure 7 we see that the 95% CI of F-values for “syn-
chronicity” (95% CI [127.21–130.52] not displayed in plot) and for “handed-
ness × hand-tested” exceeded criterion F (≈4.01, based on degrees of
freedom). The latter effect does not interact with “synchronicity.” The confi-
dence intervals of other effects did not exceed the critical F, hence after
resampling the data 1,000 times there is a high level of confidence that the
true F for “handedness” × “synchronicity” falls below the critical F.
Proprioceptive drift
Proprioceptive drift was operationalized as the difference between the esti-
mated location of the index finger before induction of the RHI and the esti-
mated location of the index finger after induction of the RHI. A larger value
indicates larger shift towards the rubber hand. As expected, synchronous
Figure 7. Confidence intervals (95%) of F Values (vertical axis) for each statistical effect
(horizontal axis: 2 = handedness, 3 = strength handedness, 4 = synchronicity, 5 = hand,
6 = handedness × strength handedness, 7 = handedness × synchronicity, 8 = strength
handedness × synchronicity, 9 = handedness × hand, 10 = strength handedness × hand,
11 = synchronicity × hand, 12 = handedness × strength handedness × synchronicity,
13 = handedness × strength handedness × hand, 14 = handedness × synchronicity ×
hand, 15 = strength handedness × synchronicity × hand, 16 = handedness × strength
handedness × synchronicity × hand). Red dashed lines represent criterion F (≈ 4.01)
[To view this figure in color, please see the online version of this journal].
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stroking resulted in a larger proprioceptive drift than asynchronous stroking
(see Figures 7 and 8) for the left and right hand respectively.
Results for the proprioceptive drift resemble results of the subjective
embodiment measurements. For “synchronicity,” a repeated measures
ANOVA revealed an expected main effect, F(1, 58) = 37.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .39,
indicating that proprioceptive drift was stronger in the synchronous than the
asynchronous condition. Other main-effects (i.e., “hand-tested,” “handedness
(left versus right),” “handedness strength” were not significant, summarized:
F(1,58) < 3.89, p > .053.
Against our expectation, there was no two-way interaction between
“hand-tested” and “synchronicity,” F(1, 58) = 0.00, p = .993, ηp2 < .01, indicat-
ing that proprioceptive drift did not differ between the left and right hand.
Next, neither the interaction between “handedness strength” and “synchro-
nicity,” F(1, 58) = 2.07, p = .155, ηp2 = .03, nor the interaction between “hand-
edness” and “synchronicity” was significant F(1, 58) = 0.26, p = .612, ηp2
< .01. Other two-way interactions that did not include the factor “synchro-
nicity” and we had no specific hypotheses about (i.e., “handedness” × “hand-
edness strength;” “handedness” × “hand-tested;” “handedness
strength” × “hand-tested”) were not significant either, summarized: F(1,
58) < 0.36, p > .550.
Against our expectations, there was no three-way interaction between
“hand-tested,” “synchronicity,” “handedness strength,” F(1, 58) = 0.01,
p = .938, ηp2 < .01, nor a three-way interaction between “hand-tested,” “syn-
chronicity,” “handedness,” F(1, 58) = 0.02, p = .888, ηp2 < .01. The three-way
interaction of “handedness” × “handedness strength” × “hand-tested” was
not significant either F(1, 58) = 0.43, p = .516, ηp2 = .01.
Figure 8. Average proprioceptive drift in the synchronous and asynchronous condition
for the left hand for the extreme- and mixed-handed division (left panel) and right-
handed and left-handed division (right panel). Error bars represent Standard Error (SE)
of the mean.
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Lastly, “synchronicity” did not interact with “hand-tested,” and different
“handedness groups” (i.e., left versus right; extreme versus mixed), F(1, 58)
= 0.48, p = .491, ηp2 = .01.
Taken together, analyses indicate that for the outcome measure proprio-
ceptive drift the type of stroking had no differential impact in either the left
or right hand and both handedness groups (i.e., left- and right-handed indi-
viduals and, extreme and mixed-handed individuals) (Figure 9).
Again, after bootstrapping (1,000 iterations) the entire data set for our
outcome measure proprioceptive drift (see Figure 10), only the confidence
intervals for the effects of “strength handedness” (mixed versus extreme)
and “synchronicity” (95% CI [42.96–44.96] not displayed in Figure 10)
exceeded criterion F (≈4.01, based on degrees of freedom). Interaction-
effects including “synchronicity” did not exceed criterion F. This indicates
that after numerous replications there is a high level of confidence that
type of stroking (synchronicity) had no differential impact in either the left
or right hand and both handedness groups.
Discussion
In previous studies, body ownership has been demonstrated to be mainly
linked to the right hemisphere and greater interhemispheric connectivity
has been shown to be associated with greater right hemispheric activation.
Mixed-handed participants tend to have more interhemispheric connectivity
compared to extreme-handed participants (Christman et al., 2008; Prichard
et al., 2013). The aim of this study was to examine whether individuals with
different handedness preferences differentially experienced feelings of
Figure 9. Average proprioceptive drift in the synchronous and asynchronous condition
for the right hand for the extreme- and mixed-handed division (left panel) and right-
handed and left-handed division (right panel). Error bars represent Standard Error (SE)
of the mean.
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ownership as measured with the RHI. In addition, we examined whether the
RHI differed for the left and right hand stroking conditions. Handedness
was differentiated in both extreme-handed, mixed-handed and left-and
right-handed individuals. Based on differences in interhemispheric connec-
tivity, we hypothesized a stronger experience of the RHI for mixed-handed
individuals as opposed to extreme-handed individuals. In addition, we
expected a higher degree of ownership for the left hand than for the right
hand in all handedness groups.
Both subjective (embodiment questionnaire) and objective (proprioceptive
drift) outcomes showed that participants experienced the illusion in the syn-
chronous stroking conditions but not the asynchronous stroking conditions,
indicating that the RHI was successfully induced. The embodiment question-
naires as well as the proprioceptive drift outcomes indicated that experience
of the RHI was similar for sinistrals, mixed-handed participants, and dextrals.
Experience of the RHI was also similar in the left and right hand stroking con-
ditions. Bootstrapping the data for both outcome measures confirmed that
after random sampling the data multiple times, there is a high level of confi-
dence that the illusion had no differential impact in either the left or right
hand and both handedness groups.
Figure 10. Confidence intervals (95%) of F Values (vertical axis) for each statistical effect
(horizontal axis: 2 = handedness, 3 = strength handedness, 4 = synchronicity, 5 = hand,
6 = handedness × strength handedness, 7 = handedness × synchronicity, 8 = strength
handedness × synchronicity, 9 = handedness × hand, 10 = strength handedness × hand,
11 = synchronicity × hand, 12 = handedness × strength handedness × synchronicity,
13 = handedness × strength handedness × hand, 14 = handedness × synchronicity ×
hand, 15 = strength handedness × synchronicity × hand, 16 = handedness × strength
handedness × synchronicity × hand). Red dashed lines represent criterion (≈4.01) [To
view this figure in color, please see the online version of this journal].
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Although previous research showed differences in interhemispheric con-
nectivity (Christman et al., 2008; Gutwinski et al., 2011; Prichard et al.,
2013), current results suggest that this affects neither the objective nor the
subjective experience of a perceptual illusion of visuotactile integration.
This may suggest that ownership may not be as lateralized as current litera-
ture indicates. However, since corpus callosum size and subsequent interhe-
mispheric connectivity were not measured directly in the current study, the
present results are based on a behavioural measure of laterality only and
therefore should not be interpreted without caution. Nevertheless, our find-
ings are consistent with Bertamini and O’Sullivan (2014) who suggested that
feelings of ownership do not depend on right hemispheric activation only.
They state that these feelings of ownership depend more on interhemi-
spheric cross-talk, hence the activation of both hemispheres during the illu-
sion. Indeed, Ehrsson et al. (2004) previously provided evidence of bilateral
premotor activation (as measured with fMRI), which correlated with the sub-
jective experience of the RHI. Additionally, Kammers et al. (2009) demon-
strated that rTMS over the left inferior posterior lobule attenuated the
strength of the illusion in perceptual body judgments (e.g., proprioceptive
judgments). Interestingly, other measures, such as subjective self-reports,
were unaffected. However, another study did find differences depending
on the hand for which the illusion was induced (Ocklenburg et al., 2011).
The reason why Ocklenburg et al. (2011) found a differential effect on hand-
edness might be due to the usage of a different objective measure (i.e., SCR)
under threatening circumstances. A high SCR while watching a syringe
approaching the hand reflects an autonomic nervous system arousal
response, implying an attentional process. Since the right hemisphere is
dominant for attention (Heilman & Van den Abell, 1980; Kinsbourne, 1970),
attentional asymmetries could account for this differential impact. Moreover,
recent work (Riemer, Bublatzky, Trojan, & Alpers, 2015) have shown physio-
logical changes (i.e., SCR) but not proprioceptive changes in the RHI under
threatening circumstances, indicating that measures such as drift and SCR
might capture different aspects of RHI, especially in an alarming
environment.
One alternative explanation for the current lack of differences in RHI
strength between the different handedness groups is that our design was
not sensitive enough to detect behavioural changes, that is, we induced the
illusion for a fixed time interval (90 seconds). We assumed that the strength
of ownership would differentially increase, that is, higher subjective experi-
ence and larger proprioceptive drift. However, since we only measured after
the 90 seconds interval, a plateau level of ownership might have been
reached, which could have masked subtle differences. In this sense, the
exact time to experience the illusion might be more sensitive to detect
changes. This is in line with results reported by Niebauer and colleagues
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(2002) found. Here participants had to say “now” as soon as ownership was
experienced, and this did result in a differential outcome; time to experience
ownership increased when laterality quotients increased (Niebauer et al.,
2002). Using this manipulation, our results might differ as a function of time
instead of strength.
In the present study, we found differences in neither embodiment nor drift
between the left and right hand. This is in line with prior research showing no
subjective differences for hand being stroked (Mussap & Salton, 2006; Nie-
bauer et al., 2002). Research published while the current research was con-
ducted also failed to show a difference in proprioceptive drift and
embodiment questions 1–3 for the left and right hand in a group of dextrals
(Bertamini & O’Sullivan, 2014). Interestingly, Bertamini, Berselli, Bode, Lawson,
and Wong (2011) reported differences in neither proprioceptive drift nor
embodiment when visual information was perceived either directly or
through a mirror. The RHI thus appears to be undiminished when the left
hand is turned into a right hand (Bertamini et al., 2011). Our research is con-
sistent with these results, which is particularly noteworthy concerning litera-
ture that linked body ownership to the right hemisphere (Frasinetti et al.,
2008; Karnath & Baier, 2010; Tsakiris et al., 2007; Vallar & Ronchi, 2009). Our
results suggest that neural representations of ownership over the left and
right hand might be similar. In the RHI tactile stimulation is first referenced
to a mental body representation and the mental body representation is sub-
sequently updated based on visuotactile integration (Serino & Haggard, 2010;
Tsakiris, 2010). Tactile stimulation evokes activity in the contralateral primary
somatosensory cortex, the bilateral secondary somatosensory cortex (Ruben
et al., 2001), the superior and inferior parietal lobule, the supplementary
and cingulate motor area and the insula (Pleger & Villringer, 2013), indicating
that the representation of the left and right hand in the somatosensory cortex
are similar. Jung, Baumgärtner, Magerl, and Treede (2011), however found a
hemispheric asymmetry of hand representation in the somatosensory
cortex, that is, the rostral area was elongated in the left hemisphere as
opposed to the right hemisphere due to a larger hand presentation,
however this was not statistically linked to handedness. Somatosensory
evoked potential studies show differences in neither topography nor
response amplitude between the left and right hemisphere (Kakigi & Shiba-
saki, 1992; Zhu, Disbrow, Zumer, McGonigle, & Nagarajan, 2007). Taken
together, this indicates that the reference frame (i.e., mental body represen-
tation) and tactile perception of the left and right hand are similar. Although
our study complements existing papers on laterality and ownership using
similar sample sizes (Niebauer et al., 2002; Ocklenburg et al., 2011) we
should be careful of making strong claims about a lack of difference, since
we are one of the few, if not only, studies that did not find a difference
between groups.
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In summary, our results show a similar experience of ownership for
extreme-handed (i.e. sinistrals, dextrals) and mixed- handed participants. In
addition, experience of the RHI is similar for the left hand and right hand in
all participants. Ownership therefore appears not to be influenced by handed-
ness. In addition, the modifiability in experiencing ownership over a body part
is similar for the left and right hand in a healthy population. These results
suggest both hands have a similar representation in the brain, which might
be useful to keep a coherent sense of the body in space. After resampling
our data we can say with high confidence that our outcomes remained unal-
tered. However different outcome measures, such as skin conductance may
reveal other patterns.
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